Updated: Friday June 30, 2017/AlJumaa
Shawwal 06, 1438/Sukravara
Asadha 09, 1939, at 05:29:17 AM
INTERNATIONAL
COURT
OF JUSTICE
Website: www.icj-cij.org Twitter Account: @CIJ_ICJ
Press Release
Unofficial
No. 2017/22 18 May 2017
Provisional
Measures
The Court indicates to the Islamic
In its Order indicating provisional measures, which was adopted unanimously, the Court also stated that the Government of Pakistan shall inform it of all measures taken in implementation of that Order. It further decided to remain seised of the matters which form the subject of the Order until it has rendered its final judgment.
History of the proceedings
Reasoning of the Court
The Court begins by considering whether it has jurisdiction prima facie to hear the case. It recalls that
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the Optional Protocol. The Court further observes that the existence of a 2008 bilateral Agreement between the Parties on consular relations does not change its conclusion on jurisdiction.
The
Court then turns to the question
whether the
rights alleged by
The Court then focuses on the issue of the link between the rights claimed and the
provisional measures requested. It considers that the measures requested are aimed at ensuring that
the rights contained in
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the
Vienna Convention, are preserved. Therefore,
a link exists between
the
rights
claimed
by
The Court then examines whether there is a risk of irreparable prejudice and urgency. It
considers that the mere fact that Mr. Jadhav is under a death sentence and might therefore be
executed is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by
The Court concludes by indicating the following measures:
Pakistan shall take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Mr. Jadhav is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings and shall inform the Court of all the measures taken in implementation of the present Order.
The Court also decides that, until it has given its final decision, it shall remain seised of the matters which form the subject-matter of this Order.
Composition of the Court
The Court was composed as follows: President Abraham; Judges Owada, Cançado Trindade, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari, Robinson, Crawford, Gevorgian; Registrar Couvreur.
Judge Cançado Trindade appends a
separate opinion
to
the
Order
of
the
Court; Judge
Bhandari appends a declaration to
the Order of the Court.
Note: The Court’s press releases do not constitute official documents.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
It
was established by the United Nations Charter in June 1945 and
began its activities
in
April 1946. The seat of the Court is at the
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twofold role: first, to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by
States (its judgments have binding force and are without appeal for the parties concerned); and,
second, to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized United Nations organs and agencies of the system. The Court is composed of 15
judges elected for a
nine-year term by the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations.
Independent of the United Nations Secretariat, it is assisted by a Registry, its own international
secretariat, whose activities are both judicial and diplomatic, as well as administrative. The official languages of the Court are French
and English. Also known as the “
The ICJ, a court open only to States for contentious proceedings, and to certain organs and institutions of the United Nations system for advisory proceedings, should not be confused with the other ¾ mostly criminal ¾ judicial institutions based in The Hague and adjacent areas, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, an ad hoc court created by the Security Council), the International Criminal Court (ICC, the first permanent international criminal court, established by treaty, which does not belong to the United Nations system), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL, an international judicial body with an independent legal personality, established by the United Nations Security Council upon the request of the Lebanese Government and composed of Lebanese and international judges), or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA, an independent institution which assists in the establishment of arbitral tribunals and facilitates their work, in accordance with the Hague Convention of 1899).
Information
Department:
Mr. Andrey Poskakukhin, First Secretary of the Court, Head of Department (+31 (0)70 302 2336) Mr. Boris Heim and Ms Joanne Moore, Information Officers (+31 (0)70 302 2337)
Mr. Avo Sevag Garabet, Associate Information Officer (+31 (0)70 302 2394)
Ms Genoveva Madurga, Administrative
Assistant (+31 (0)70 302
2396)
Annex to Press Release No. 2017/22
1. In his Concurring Opinion, composed of seven parts, Judge Cançado Trindade begins by pointing out that, having concurred with his vote to the adoption of the present Order indicating Provisional Measures of Protection, there are certain aspects pertaining to the matter dealt with therein to which he attaches great importance. He feels thus obliged to append his Concurring Opinion thereto, so as to leave on the records the foundations of his own personal position thereon. He purports to address the selected points bringing them into the realm of juridical epistemology.
2. The points he proceeds to examine (part I) are: (a) rights of States and of individuals as subjects of international law; (b) presence of rights of States and of individuals together; (c) the right to information on consular assistance in the framework of the guarantees of the due process of law; (d) the fundamental (rather than “plausible”) human right to be protected: provisional measures as jurisdictional guarantees of a preventive character; (e) the autonomous legal regime of provisional measures of protection; and (f) the humanization of international law as manifested in the domain of consular law.
3. The present Jadhav case concerns alleged violations of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations with regard to the detention and trial of an Indian national (Mr. K.S. Jadhav), sentenced to death (on 10.04.2017) by a Court Martial in Pakistan. Keeping in mind the distinct lines of arguments advanced by the two contending parties (India and Pakistan) before the ICJ, he observes at first that the present case “brings to the fore rights of States and of individuals emanating directly from international law” under Article 36(1) of the 1963 Vienna Convention, as related to the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (paras. 5-6).
4. Judge Cançado Trindade stresses that, in “contemporary international law, rights of States and of individuals are indeed to be considered altogether, they cannot be dissociated from each other” (para. 7). He recalls that, before the turn of the century, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR] delivered its pioneering Advisory Opinion no 16 on the Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law (of 01.10.1999), advancing the proper hermeneutics of Article 36 (1) (b) of the 1963 Vienna Convention, reflecting the impact thereon of the corpus juris of the International Law of Human Rights (ILHR).
5. On that occasion, - he further recalls, -he appended a Concurring Opinion appended to that Advisory Opinion no 16, wherein he examined that impact, putting an end to the “old monopoly of the State of the condition of being subject of rights”, and demystifying the constraints of an outdated voluntarist positivism (para. 8). He then warned that those constraints “had wrongly been indifferent to other areas of human knowledge, as well as to the existential time of human beings”, with its “obsession with the autonomy of the `will´ of the States”, and he added:
“It so happens that the very emergence and consolidation of the corpus juris of the ILHR are due to the reaction of the universal juridical conscience to the recurrent abuses committed against human beings, often warranted by positive law: with that, the Law came to the encounter of human beings, the ultimate titulaires of their inherent rights protected by its norms (...).
In the framework of this new corpus juris, one cannot remain indifferent to the contribution of other areas of human knowledge, nor to the existential time of human
beings. (...) [T]he right to information on consular assistance (...), “cannot nowadays be appreciated in the framework of exclusively inter-State relations, as contemporary legal science has come to admit that the contents and effectiveness of juridical norms accompany the evolution of time, not being independent of this latter” (...).
Thus, (...) Article 36 (1) (b) of the aforementioned 1963 Vienna Convention, in spite of having preceded in time the provisions of the two U.N. Covenants on Human Rights (of 1966), could no longer be dissociated from the international norms of protection of human rights concerning the guarantees of the due process of law and their evolutive interpretation” (paras. 9-11).
6. Judge Cançado Trindade holds (part III) that “States and individuals are subjects of contemporary international law; the crystallization of the subjective individual right to information on consular assistance bears witness of such evolution” (para. 12). The ICJ itself took into account the ILHR in the case of Hostages in Tehran (Provisional Measures, Order of 15.12.1979) (paras. 12-13), and, much later, the “presence of rights of States and of individuals together” was acknowledged in express terms by ICJ in the case of Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Judgment of 31.03.2004 para. 40), where it stated that “violations of the rights of the individual under Article 36 [of the 1963 Vienna Convention] may entail a violation of the rights of the sending State, and that violations of the rights of the latter may entail a violation of the rights of the individual” (para. 14).
7. The present Jadhav case affords, in his view, yet another occasion to keep in mind the formation of an opinio juris communis to this effect (para. 16), corresponding to a new ethos of our times (para. 18). It has thus become indispensable to link, for the purpose of protection, — he ponders, — “the right to information on consular assistance with the guarantees of the due process of law” set forth in the instruments of the ILHR, bearing witness of the process of humanization of international law, as manifested in particular also in the domain of consular law nowadays (part IV).
8. Provisional measures of protection — he proceeds — have become true jurisdictional guarantees of a preventive character (paras. 7 and 22), safeguarding, to begin with, the fundamental and non-derogable (rather than “plausible”) right to life (in addition to the right to liberty and security of person, and the right to a fair trial) (part V). Judge Cançado Trindade draws attention to the importance of compliance with provisional measures of protection, as illustrated by the IACtHR’s Orders in the case (of so-called “mandatory” death penalty) of James and Others versus Trinidad and Tobago (1998-2000), where the condemned individuals were not executed and the condemnatory sentences of the national tribunals were commuted (paras. 20-21).
9. Judge Cançado Trindade next considers the “autonomous legal regime of provisional measures of protection (part VI), in its component elements, namely: “the rights to be protected, the obligations proper to provisional measures of protection; the prompt determination of responsibility (in case of non-compliance), with its legal consequences; the presence of the victim (or potential victim, already at this stage), and the duty of reparations for damages” (para. 24). He proceeds that, even though the proceedings in contentious case before the ICJ keep on being strictly inter-State ones (by “attachment to an outdated dogma of the past”), this in no way impedes that the beneficiaries of protection in given circumstances are the human beings themselves, individually or in groups, - as he pointed out also in his Dissenting Opinion in the case concerning Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or to Extradite (Order of 28.05.2009), and in his Separate Opinion in the case of Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism [ICSFT] and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [CERD] (Order of 19.04.2017) (para. 25).
10. Judge Cançado Trindade comes to the last part of his Concurring Opinion addressing the ongoing historical process of the humanization of international law (part VII), manifesting itself, as in the present Jadhav case, in particular also in the domain of consular law. He recalls that, already in his earlier Concurring Opinion in the IACtHR’s Advisory Opinion no 18 on the Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants (of 17.09.2003), he examined this process singling out the relevance, in its evolution, of fundamental principles, laying on the foundations themselves of the law of nations (le droit des gens, as foreseen by the “founding fathers” of the discipline), as well as of the emergence of jus cogens and the corresponding obligations erga omnes of protection, in their horizontal and vertical dimensions (para. 28). Those principles, - he added therein,
“form the substratum of the legal order itself, revealing the right to the Law (droit au Droit), of which are titulaires all human beings, irrespective of their statute of citizenship or any other circumstance (...). Without such principles, - which are truly prima principia, - wherefrom norms and rules emanate and wherein they find their meaning, the ‘legal order’ simply is not accomplished, and ceases to exist as such” (para. 29).
11. In his view, the “great legacy of the juridical thinking of the second half of the XXth century (...) has been, by means of the emergence and evolution of the ILHR, the rescue of the human being as subject” of the law of nations, endowed with international legal personality and capacity (para. 30). This was due — he proceeds — to “the awakening of the universal juridical conscience”, — the “recta ratio inherent to humanity, — as the ultimate material source of the law of nations, standing well above the ‘will’ of individual States” (para. 30). And Judge Cançado Trindade concludes:
“That outlook has decisively contributed to the formation, inter alia and in particular, of an opinio juris communis as to the right of individuals, under Article 36 (1) (b) of the 1963 Vienna Convention, reflecting the ongoing process of humanization of international law, encompassing relevant aspects of consular relations. Always faithful to this humanist universal outlook, I deem it fit to advance it, once again, in the present Concurring Opinion in the Order that the ICJ has just adopted today, 15.05.2017, in the Jadhav Case.
The ICJ has, after all, shown awareness that the provisional measures of protection rightly indicated by it in the present Order (resolutory point I of the dispositif) are aimed at preserving the rights of both the State and the individual concerned (...) under Article 36 (1) the 1963 Vienna Convention. The jurisprudential construction to this effect, thus, to my satisfaction, keeps on moving forward. Contemporary international tribunals have a key role to play in their common mission of realization of justice” (paras. 32-33).
Judge Bhandari agrees with the decision of the Court to indicate provisional measures.
However, he wishes to place on record his views concerning the requirements for indicating provisional measures in more detail. This case gives rise to questions pertaining to the basic violation of human rights through the denial of consular access during the pendency of court
proceedings in
In his declaration, Judge
Bhandari starts by outlining the facts pertaining to
Concerning the facts
of the
case, Judge Bhandari underscores the
uncertainty surrounding the circumstances in which Mr. Jadhav was arrested. He makes clear that the Parties do not agree as to where Mr. Jadhav was arrested, whether within or outside
Before addressing the
requirements for indicating provisional measures, Judge Bhandari analyses the role of the 2008 India-Pakistan Agreement on Consular Access. He agrees with the
Court that there is nothing which prima facie
suggests
that the
Parties,
by concluding the 2008 Agreement, have limited or set aside their reciprocal obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. On the contrary, the 2008 Agreement amplifies, confirms and extends the Parties’ reciprocal obligations relating to consular assistance, for which the Vienna Convention is a framework. Therefore, the 2008 Agreement does not exclude the Court’s jurisdiction in the present case. Moreover, Judge Bhandari stresses that
On prima facie jurisdiction, Judge Bhandari recalls that
With reference to plausibility, Judge Bhandari recalls the Court’s test as recently restated in
Concerning real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice, Judge Bhandari analysed the similarities between the present case and the previous death penalty cases: Breard, LaGrand and Avena. In all such cases, which involved facts comparable to the facts of Mr. Jadhav’s case, the Court found that the execution of the foreign national would have irreparably prejudiced the rights of consular access claimed by the sending State on the merits. Moreover, Judge Bhandari clarified that it does not matter, for making a finding of urgency, how long a period of time is likely to elapse before Mr. Jadhav is executed. So long as there is a real risk that Mr. Jadhav would be executed before the final disposal of the case by the Court, there is urgency in the circumstances.
On the link between the provisional measures requested and the rights claimed on the merits, Judge Bhandari again highlighted the continuity between the previous death penalty cases and the present case. In all such cases, the Court always indicated that the respondent State should not execute the person whose consular rights were at stake in the proceedings before the Court, and that the respondent State should inform the Court as to the measures taken in the implementation of the order. Therefore, Judge Bhandari agreed that the same provisional measures should be indicated in the present case.
Judge Bhandari concludes that a clear case has been made out for the indication of
provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute. Consequently, during the pendency of the proceedings before the Court, Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav shall not be executed. In addition to issues of consular relations, this is a case in which it regrettably appears, on a preliminary
examination of the facts, that the basic human rights of Mr. Jadhav have been violated by not
allowing
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